

## DID MARK ANTONY CONTEMPLATE AN ALLIANCE WITH HIS POLITICAL ENEMIES IN JULY 44 B.C.E.?

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THIS PAPER SEEKS TO DISPEL the prevailing view that Mark Antony signaled a willingness to draw closer to his political enemies in the Senate in late July 44 B.C.E. Cicero informs us that rumors of a possible reconciliation between Antony and the "Liberators" Brutus and Cassius were brought to him on 7 August when he was waiting not far from Rhegium (on the "toe" of Italy) to continue his voyage to Greece (*Att.* 16.7.1; *Phil.* 1.7–8). The story has also made its way into Plutarch (*Cic.* 43.4). Scholars lay particular stress on Cicero's remark that he first began to think of returning to Rome after he read a transcript of a speech (*contio*) by Antony that was brought to him by some townsmen of Rhegium. Unfortunately Cicero tells us nothing specific about the contents of that speech, but modern accounts characterize it as having an "unexpectedly moderate tone,"<sup>1</sup> one that was "friendly and favourable to the Liberators."<sup>2</sup> This interpretation rests on the assumption that in his speech Antony extended an olive branch to Brutus and Cassius. According to the standard reconstruction of events in late July, Antony was forced to adopt a radical shift in policy in the direction of drawing closer to the Senate. He did so, it is argued, out of a need to form a new political alliance as a counterweight to the threat posed by the surging popularity of Julius Caesar's chief heir Octavian, the future emperor Augustus. The precipitating factor that supposedly influenced Antony to change political course is said to be the success of Octavian's games in honor of Caesar and Venus Genetrix (20–c. 28 July),<sup>3</sup> during which the appearance of a daylight comet (the *sidus Iulium*) was interpreted as a sign of Caesar's apotheosis.<sup>4</sup>

References to works of Cicero are by title only. I thank D. R. Shackleton Bailey, Peter White, and Michael Alexander for reading an earlier draft of this paper and for making many helpful comments. They are not, of course, to be held responsible for any of the views expressed here.

The map (p. 263) originated on the Interactive Ancient Mediterranean Web site (<http://iam.classics.unc.edu>) and has been copied and edited under the terms of IAM's fair use policy. I thank my son David Ramsey for adapting this material.

1. Holmes 1928, 22.

2. Syme 1939, 117.

3. In 44, this festival was most likely celebrated under the name *Ludi Veneris Genetricis* (Ramsey and Licht 1997, 5–8) and ran from 20 to about 28 July (Ramsey and Licht 1997, 54–55), whereas under the Empire the *Ludi Victoriae Caesaris* occupied 20–30 July.

4. This is the view that prevails in all the modern accounts of this period. Scholars speak, for instance, of Antony's intention to meet the Liberators halfway ("diesen entgegenzukommen," Drumann and Groebe

A closer examination of the sources, I hope to show, reveals that Antony made no such tilt in the direction of friendly relations with his political enemies in the Senate. Rather, the attested rumors in mid- to late July of a possible improvement in relations between Antony and the Liberators were inspired by the popular demonstrations in favor of Brutus at his lavish production of the *Ludi Apollinares* (6–13 July) coupled with behind-the-scenes maneuvering to build upon this support at a meeting of the Senate called for 1 August. At the same time, the supporters of Brutus and Cassius must have observed with satisfaction the escalating struggle between Antony and Octavian to win the loyalty of Caesar's veterans and devoted followers. Antony's *contio* more than likely was delivered in the context of that struggle. Those who wished to see Brutus and Cassius return to Rome and resume their duties as praetors doubtless hoped to exploit the rivalry between Antony and Octavian, but those supporters were thwarted by the rapid march of events that, by early August, further solidified Antony's power and cast Octavian back into the shadows.

This period from the middle of July until the end of August is one about which we are not terribly well informed because the steady stream of Cicero's letters, which are so rich and informative about Roman politics from 7 April to about 10 July, abruptly tails off when Cicero set sail for Greece on 17 July.<sup>5</sup> From that time until he returned to Rome on 31 August, Cicero received hardly any news from the capital, and only a few letters survive from this period.<sup>6</sup> From other sources, however, we do catch glimpses of several important developments during the summer that involved especially the rivalry between Antony and Octavian. It is very worthwhile, therefore, to establish, if we can, what policies Antony, as senior consul, was pursuing in July and August 44, and to determine whether he showed any signs of wavering in the face of Octavian's growing prestige (the *communis opinio*) or stood his ground (the view of this paper).

On the surface, there are certain difficulties in accepting the stock notion that Antony considered entering into some kind of political alliance, or understanding, with the Liberators. For one thing, if he did so, there is an extremely narrow window of opportunity for him to shift his stance a full 180 degrees first towards friendly relations with Brutus and Cassius, and then back again to his former attitude of being outwardly respectful but adamantly opposed to granting them any role in public affairs.<sup>7</sup> If this change in the direction of friendly relations was inspired by popular demonstrations at Octavian's games, then it must have occurred at the earliest around 25

1899, 430–31), of his intention to form a "firm pact with the Liberators" (Syme 1939, 117), or of "signs of a renewed understanding between them [Brutus and Cassius] and Antony" (Pelling 1988, 158); cf. Frisch 1946, 113–14, Ehrenwirth 1971, 65, and Rawson 1994, 474–76.

5. The date of Cicero's departure is established by *Att.* 16.6.1, and the latest datable news from the capital to reach Cicero before he set out was confirmation of the delivery of *Att.* 16.1, written on 8 July (mentioned in *Att.* 16.3.3 of 17 July). More than sixty letters are preserved in the collection *Ad Atticum* for the period of 102 days from 7 April to 17 July (*Att.* 14.1–16.3), to which we can add nearly a dozen letters *Ad familiares* (nos. 322–32 in Shackleton Bailey 1977).

6. Five letters in all: two to Atticus (*Att.* 16.6 and 16.7) and three *Ad familiares* (7.19, 7.20, 11.3).

7. *Phil.* 2.30 attests that as late as 19 Sept. Antony still adopted a respectful manner of address towards Brutus in his speeches.

July, after the games commenced on 20 July and the response of the people on the first few days convinced Antony of the threat to his power. Yet all hope for a rapprochement between Antony and the Liberators vanished on 1 August, when the meeting of the Senate failed to produce any thaw in the chilly relations between Antony and the tyrannicides.<sup>8</sup>

Next, let us consider the motivation that supposedly accounts for Antony's willingness to contemplate reaching an understanding with his political enemies in the Senate. Octavian's games, it appears, were a success and may even have produced demonstrations hostile to Antony.<sup>9</sup> Popular demonstrations also occurred at Brutus' *Ludi Apollinares* earlier in July. At the time, Cicero even expressed concern that the outpouring of sympathy for Brutus might drive Antony to some desperate act of retaliation, and yet nothing was achieved in Brutus' favor (*Att.* 16.2.3). We can be sure of this because Cicero tells us that the people cheered and applauded loudly but showed no signs of being willing to defend their freedom (*loc. cit.*; cf. *App. B Civ.* 3.24). The same is more than likely to have been true of the attested demonstrations in favor of Octavian at his games—impressive, but not so threatening as to cause Antony to contemplate a reversal of political course.

Furthermore, in testing the theory that the success of Octavian's games may have driven Antony to the desperate act of extending an olive branch to his political enemies, we must constantly bear in mind that the bulk of what we are told about the popular reception of those games and the *sidus Iulium* appears to go back ultimately to Octavian's memoirs, *De vita sua*, hardly an unbiased source. Even the favorable impression that "Caesar's comet" is said to have made on the public as a positive omen, signifying Caesar's apotheosis, may be greatly exaggerated. The comet, though real enough, was not necessarily as grand as our much later sources make it out to be since all of those sources show signs of having been influenced by the "official" version that was concocted by Octavian and his supporters (including Virgil, Horace, and Ovid).<sup>10</sup>

On the other side of the equation, Antony appears to have been in an extremely strong position both politically and militarily throughout the summer, hardly needing to turn to the Senate for comfort and aid. The large throng of Caesar's veterans that Antony collected in Campania and led to Rome around 18 May effectively intimidated and silenced the opposition.<sup>11</sup>

8. On 17 Aug., during his return voyage, Cicero met M. Brutus at Velia and learned from him how the meeting of the Senate on 1 August had left Antony in a stronger position than before (*Att.* 16.7.5; cf. *Phil.* 1.9, 14–15). Within days, Antony wrote an insulting letter to Brutus and Cassius and issued a hostile edict (*Fam.* 11.3.1 of 4 Aug.).

9. Nic. Dam. *Vita Caes.* 28.108 attests popular demonstrations at Octavian's games. The reference in *Phil.* 1.38 to *clamores* at a show of gladiators is perhaps to be connected with Octavian's *ludi funebres* in honor of Caesar, which included a show of gladiators and was combined with the festival in honor of Venus Genetrix (see Ramsey and Licht 1997, 48–50).

10. See Ramsey and Licht 1997, 63 and Appendix V (p. 189). It is a mistake to refer to the *sidus Iulium* as "the fortunate appearance of a comet": so Taylor 1931, 242. The effect of the comet on contemporary observers must have been far from positive in the first instance since comets were invariably baleful omens: see Flintoff 1992, 67–70 and Ramsey and Licht 1997, 65.

11. *Phil.* 1.108 (cf. 100). The exodus of important senators from Rome on 18 May that was reported by Atticus' letter (*Att.* 15.3.1) establishes the probable date of Antony's return to Rome with his bodyguard of ex-soldiers, numbering some 6,000 according to Appian (*B Civ.* 3.5).

In late May, Brutus and Cassius wrote to Antony to complain of the presence of that armed menace in Rome (*Fam.* 11.2). On 1 June, many senators, including the consuls-designate, stayed away from the meeting called by Antony, who then proceeded to pass through the Assembly a host of measures to strengthen his position (*Phil.* 1.6, cf. 2.108–9). The continued presence of Antony's armed followers in Rome deterred Brutus from returning to the capital to preside over the *Ludi Apollinares*, which it was his duty to sponsor as *praetor urbanus* (*Att.* 15.11.2, 12.1). The blatant show of force by Antony also dissuaded Cicero from attending Brutus' games out of regard for his friend, although Brutus requested his presence (*Att.* 15.26.1). Then, in addition to these armed followers, Antony could count on the loyal backing of two members of his immediate family who were also office-holders (Plut. *Ant.* 15.5). One of these political allies was his brother Gaius, who was praetor in 44 and presided over the *Ludi Apollinares* as Brutus' surrogate, thus sharing in some of the popularity won by that lavish display.<sup>12</sup> Equally useful to Antony was his other brother, Lucius, who was a tribune of the plebs. Lucius possessed tremendous political clout as a result of being chairman of the agrarian board of seven (*Vilviri*) established by Antony's legislation in June to distribute land to Caesar's veterans and the poor.<sup>13</sup> If we take into account the great political and military power enjoyed by Antony, it seems hard to believe that he would briefly consider forming a political alliance with Caesar's murderers out of a need to counter the growing popularity of Octavian. Even to contemplate, or breathe a word, of such a pact with the Liberators would put in serious jeopardy Antony's claim to be the chief leader of the followers of the murdered dictator.

Let us now examine the sources, both to determine what they actually say about a possible understanding being reached between Antony and his political foes, and to explain, if we can, how Cicero's informants came to hope for a change for the better in the political fortunes of Brutus and Cassius towards the end of July. Of the three passages that are relevant, Plutarch (*Cic.* 43.4) alone goes so far as to assert that the reports brought to Cicero from Rome made the claim that Antony had already undergone a remarkable change for the better. He writes:

During a delay in Cicero's voyage, as frequently happens, unexpected news reached him from Rome. He was told that Antony had undergone a remarkable change and was doing all and fashioning all of his policies with reference to the authority of the Senate. It only required Cicero's presence in Rome for affairs to have the best disposition. Thereupon, Cicero blamed his excessive caution and turned back again to Rome.<sup>14</sup>

As we shall see when we turn to the Ciceronian passages below, the news brought to Cicero by the townsmen of Rhegium was indeed of a positive na-

12. App. *B Civ.* 2.23; Dio (47.20.2) mistakenly identifies him as a surrogate of Cassius, instead of Brutus.

13. Broughton 1952, 332–33. In recognition of his power, L. Antonius was adopted as *patronus* by the thirty-five tribes, the *equites*, ex-military tribunes, and moneylenders; and statues were erected to him in the Forum (*Phil.* 6.12–15, 7.16).

14. γενομένης δὲ περὶ τὸν πλοῦν διατριβῆς, καὶ λόγων ἀπὸ Ῥώμης οἷα φιλεῖ καινῶν προσπεσόντων, μεταβεβλησθαι μὲν Ἀντώνιον θαυμαστὴν μεταβολὴν καὶ πάντα πράττειν καὶ πολιτεύεσθαι πρὸς τὴν σύγκλητον, ἐνδεῖν δὲ τῆς ἐκείνου παρουσίας τὰ πράγματα μὴ τὴν ἀρίστην ἔχειν διάθεσιν, καταμεμψάμενος αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τὴν εὐλάβειαν ἀνέστρεψεν αὐτὸς εἰς Ῥώμην.

ture, but it stopped short of claiming that Antony had *already* reached an understanding with the Senate. The hopes of Cicero's informants for such a rapprochement had reference to the future, and so Plutarch, who undoubtedly drew his information from Cicero,<sup>15</sup> has distorted the picture, whether to serve a structural purpose,<sup>16</sup> or possibly out of an oversimplification (or an imperfect recollection?) of his source.<sup>17</sup> Consequently the speech (*contio*) delivered by Antony assumes great importance in the standard reconstruction of Antony's political maneuvering in July because that speech provides the sole piece of evidence that can be used to argue for an outright change in Antony's attitude toward Brutus and Cassius. Since, however, it will be shown below that the *contio* almost certainly fell a few days before Octavian's games began, that speech can no longer be used to prop up the theory that Antony contemplated joining forces with the Liberators in reaction to popular demonstrations at those games. Rather, some other explanation must be offered to account for the hopes expressed by Cicero's informants, that Antony would moderate his policies and that Brutus and Cassius would be able to return to Rome.

Let us reconstruct the sequence of events on the day of Cicero's interview with the Rhegians on 7 August and establish, if we can, the chronology of events in Rome after Cicero's departure from his villa near Pompeii on 17 July. The two relevant passages are presented side by side, with italics drawing attention to the many verbal similarities.

(§1) VIII Id. Sext. cum a Leucopetra profectus (inde enim *tramittebam*) stadia circiter CCC processissem, *reiectus sum Austro* vehementi ad eandem Leucopetram. ibi cum *ventum expectarem* (erat enim villa Valeri nostri, ut familiariter essem et libenter), Regini quidam illustres homines *eo venerunt Roma sane recentes*, in iis Bruti nostri hospes, qui Brutum Neapoli reliquisset. haec *adferrebant, edictum Bruti et Cassi*, et fore

(§7) cum autem me ex Sicilia ad Leucopetram, quod est promunturium agri Regini, venti detulissent, ab eo loco conscendi ut *transmitterem*; nec ita multum proventus *reiectus Austro sum* in eum ipsum locum unde conscenderam. (§8) cumque intempesta nox esset manissemque in villa P. Valeri, . . . postridieque apud eundem *ventum expectans* manerem, municipes Regini complures *ad me venerunt*, ex eis quidam *Roma recentes*:

15. Moles (1988, 28–29, 193) identifies *Att.* 16.7.1 and *Phil.* 1.7–8 as Plutarch's sources, but it is likely that Plutarch gleaned all of his information from the first *Philippic* alone, a speech that he appears to have consulted for at least two other sections of his *Cicero* (42.3 and 43.6–7, cf. *Phil.* 1.1 and 1.12). Also, *Phil.* 1.8, but not *Att.* 16.7.1, reports the explicit prediction that Antony "would return to the guidance of the Senate" (*ad auctoritatem senatus esse rediturum*), precisely the change in Antony's conduct claimed by Plutarch.

16. Moles (1988, 193) speculates that Plutarch fashioned his account of this incident with a view to providing a companion piece to the ploy adopted by another of Cicero's enemies, P. Clodius, who feigned a willingness to patch up his quarrel with Cicero in 58 B.C.E. (*Plut. Cic.* 30.4). The parallel is not exact, but as Christopher Pelling has pointed out to me, both stories do illustrate Cicero's proneness to be "taken in" by false reports, and in both instances Cicero abandoned a plan that involved his withdrawal from Rome and would have ensured his safety (in 58 he turned down Caesar's offer of a legateship, which would have shielded him from Clodius' attack). The big difference is that in 58 Clodius *deliberately* sought to trick Cicero, whereas in 44 Antony is not credited with taking any role in spreading the reports that misled Cicero. I owe this latter observation to a discussion of the passage with Kenneth Mayer.

17. The discrepancies between *Plut. Cic.* 43.4 and *Phil.* 1.8 (regarding the nature of the news brought to Cicero), as well as those between *Cic.* 43.7 and *Phil.* 1.12 (regarding the precise nature of the threats made by Antony), are of the sort that Pelling (1979, 93) has observed often result from Plutarch's imperfect memory of his reading.

*frequentem senatum Kalendis*, a Bruto et Cassio litteras missas ad consularis et praetorios, ut adessent rogare. summam spem nuntiabant fore ut Antonius cederet, *res conveniret*, nostri Romam redirent. addebant etiam me desiderari, subaccusari. (§2) Quae cum audissem, sine ulla dubitatione abieci consilium profectionis, quo mehercule ne antea quidem delectabar. lectis vero tuis litteris admiratus equidem sum te tam vehementer sententiam commutasse. (*Att.* 16.7.1–2)<sup>18</sup>

a quibus primum accipio Antoni con-  
tionem, quae mihi ita placuit ut ea lecta  
de reversione primum coeperim cogi-  
tare. nec ita multo post *edictum Bruti*  
*adfertur et Cassi* quod . . . plenum aequi-  
tatis videbatur. addebant praeterea—fit  
enim plerumque ut ei qui boni quid vol-  
unt adferre adfingant aliquid quo faciant  
id quod nuntiant laetius—*rem conven-  
turam, Kalendis Sextilibus senatum fre-  
quentem fore*, Antonium, repudiatis malis  
suasoribus, remissis provinciis Galliis,  
ad auctoritatem senatus esse rediturum.  
(*Phil.* 1.7–8)<sup>19</sup>

Neither one of these passages tells the whole story, but the two taken together permit us to piece together many of the details. We can determine, for instance, that the interview took place on 7 August because *Epistulae ad Atticum* 16.7.1 gives 6 August (*VIII Id. Sext.*) as the date of Cicero's attempt to sail from Leucopetra, while *Philippic* 1.8 states that his visitors arrived on the following day (*postridie*). *Philippic* 1.8, which alone mentions Antony's *contio*, also makes it clear that Cicero's callers, who came straight from Rome (*Roma sane recentes*) did not have in their possession a copy of the edict issued by Brutus and Cassius because Cicero states in the *Philippic* that the edict came to his notice a little later that day (*nec ita multo post*). *Epistulae ad Atticum* 16.7.1 reveals the likely bearer of that edict, Brutus' *hospes*, who apparently stopped off on the return trip from Rome to call upon Brutus near Naples (*Brutum Neapoli reliquisset*<sup>20</sup>). Since this in-

18. "When I had set out from Leucopetra on 6 August with the intention of crossing over [to Greece] and had proceeded approximately 33 miles, I was blown back to Leucopetra by a stiff south wind. While I was waiting there for a favorable wind and taking advantage of the friendly and generous hospitality offered by the villa belonging to my friend Valerius, some distinguished citizens of the town of Rhegium, quite fresh from Rome, paid me a visit. Among them was a guest-friend of our Brutus who said that he had left Brutus at Naples. They brought with them an edict of Brutus and Cassius and the news that there was to be a *frequens* meeting of the Senate on the 1st, that Brutus and Cassius had sent letters to the consulars and praetorians, urging them to attend. The Rhegians announced the highest hopes that Antony would back down, that a settlement would be reached [between Antony and his opponents], and that our friends [Brutus and Cassius] would return to Rome. They added that my absence was being regretted and even somewhat criticized. (§2) After I heard this, without any hesitation I cast aside my intention of setting out on my journey, a plan that, I assure you, had not pleased me even previously. But when I read your letter, I was amazed that you had so radically changed your opinion [about the appropriateness of my plan to depart from Italy]."

19. "And after winds had carried me off course from Sicily to Leucopetra, which is a cape in the district of Rhegium, I boarded a ship so as to cross over [to Greece] from there, but I did not get very far before I was driven back by a south wind to the precise place from which I had embarked. It being the dead of night, after I had stayed at the villa of P. Valerius, and while I was remaining there on the following day, awaiting a favorable wind, quite a few townsmen from Rhegium paid me a visit, among them some fresh from Rome. I first learned of Antony's speech from these visitors, and it made such a favorable impression on me that I first began to think about breaking off my journey after I had read the text of that speech. And not so very long afterwards there was brought to me an edict of Brutus and Cassius which seemed to me full of fairness. . . . My visitors from Rhegium added over and above this—for it generally happens that those who wish to bring some good news embellish it so as to make their announcement more cheery—that a settlement would be reached [between Antony and his opponents]; that there was to be a *frequens* meeting of the Senate on 1 August; and that Antony would renounce his wicked advisors, relinquish [his five-year term to govern] the Gauls [Cisalpine and Transalpine], and return to the guidance of the Senate."

20. The subjunctive *reliquisset* indicates that this assertion rests on a statement made to Cicero by his informant. Brutus was then residing at the villa of his cousin M. Lucullus on the Isle of Nesis, which is sit-

dividual split off from the main traveling party, his arrival in Rhegium (and subsequent call upon Cicero) was independent of theirs. This *hospes* is doubtless also the source of the information about the letters that Brutus and Cassius sent to urge their supporters to attend the meeting of the Senate called for 1 August. Cicero fails to mention those letters in the first *Philippic*, which is understandable. The meeting on 1 August had failed to produce the outcome desired by the Liberators—to say nothing of the optimistic predictions of the Rhegians that Antony would relinquish his claim to govern the two Gauls—and so there was no point in drawing attention to the failed maneuvers of Brutus and Cassius behind the scenes.<sup>21</sup>

A comparable omission of detail in *Epistulae ad Atticum* 16.7.1, the failure to mention Antony's speech, is less easy to explain if we accept the standard view of Antony's maneuvers in this period. It is surely surprising that Cicero fails to say a single word about Antony's *contio* in his letter to Atticus if, as scholars assume, that speech gave some indication of Antony's willingness to strike a deal with Brutus and Cassius. The many verbal similarities between *Epistulae ad Atticum* 16.7.1 and *Philippic* 1.7–8 show that Cicero was covering in both passages what amounts to a set number of salient points in his conversation with the Rhegians on 7 August, and so for some reason it suited Cicero's purposes to mention Antony's *contio* in the *Philippic* but not in his letter to Atticus. Moreover, if we look more closely, we can see that the account of the Rhegians' prediction of some future understanding between Antony and the Liberators (*rem conventuram*) is not tied in any way to the *contio*. In the letter, as noted, all mention of the *contio* is absent, and in the *Philippic*, the predictions of a change in Antony's attitude are introduced after the edict of Brutus and Cassius is brought to Cicero's notice. Cicero also makes it clear in the *Philippic* that the Rhegians stretched the truth (*adfingant aliquid*) and did not base their predictions of a moderation in Antony's policies upon any clear indication of a shift that scholars suppose was contained in Antony's *contio*.

Hence, the *contio* turns out to be something of a red herring. There is, in fact, no need to appeal to it in order to explain how the Rhegians could have interpreted the mood in Rome after Brutus' lavish production of the *Ludi Apollinares* as pointing to a likely improvement in the political fortunes of the Liberators.<sup>22</sup> Their hopes were pinned on the meeting of the Senate called for 1 August, and the letters dispatched by Brutus and Cassius urging their supporters to attend that meeting certainly indicate that their interests were somehow bound up with an item on the agenda. Scholars have plausibly suggested that what Brutus and Cassius may have hoped to bring about was a cancellation of an earlier *senatus consultum* that had charged them with collecting and shipping grain from Asia and Sicily to

uated just off the headland between Puteoli and Naples (*Phil.* 10.8; *Att.* 16.1.1). From there, Brutus anxiously awaited news of how his lavish production of the *Ludi Apollinares* (6–13 July) would be greeted in Rome. He was hoping for a popular demonstration that would permit him to return to Rome and resume his duties as *praetor urbanus*.

21. See n. 8 above.

22. Plutarch (*Brut.* 21.3) attests Brutus' vast outlay of resources on this festival.

Rome.<sup>23</sup> This would account for the hope of the Rhegians that Brutus and Cassius might soon return to Rome (*nostri Romam redirent*, Att. 16.7.1), and it suits what we are told about the edict of Brutus and Cassius in *Epistulae ad familiares* 11.3.1. From that letter, we learn that Brutus and Cassius made some request of Antony in their edict (*aliquid edicto postulassemus a consule*) and that Antony took offense at their announced intention to lay aside a *ius* that they possessed (*de suo iure decedere*).<sup>24</sup> Since their duties in July were defined by the *senatus consultum* establishing the *curatio frumenti*, an unwelcome assignment orchestrated by Antony to remove them from Italy (Att. 15.12.1), and since they had decided in early June to lobby for the repeal of that special commission overseas,<sup>25</sup> we can be reasonably certain that this was their aim on 1 August.

It was apparently at about this time that Brutus and Cassius were assigned the propraetorian provinces of Crete and Cyrene for 43 B.C.E.,<sup>26</sup> and if the Senate was expected to act on that matter on 1 August, it provided a logical opening for the Liberators to request a repeal of their current assignment to collect and ship grain.<sup>27</sup> Furthermore, the fact that in both *Epistulae ad Atticum* 16.7.1 and *Philippic* 1.8 this projected meeting is described as one that was to be *frequens* (i.e., a plenary session) points to the conclusion that it was to take up a matter of some importance, one that required a quorum. We know that magistrates occasionally specified in their edict, when they summoned a meeting, that it was to be *frequens*.<sup>28</sup> Antony, for instance, announced a *frequens senatus* for 24 November (postponed to the 28th), when one of the items on the agenda was a proposal to vote a *supplicatio* for Lepidus, a measure that required a quorum.<sup>29</sup> Since we know that a quorum was also required when the Senate intended to vote a *privilegium* (a mea-

23. See Shackleton Bailey's note on *Fam.* 11.3.1. The *senatus consultum* establishing the *curatio frumenti* had been passed on 5 June (Att. 15.9.1).

24. An apparent reference to their *curatio frumenti* (so Denniston 1926, 76). It seems less likely that the words *de suo iure decedere* refer to an offer of Brutus and Cassius to resign their praetorships, although this is the interpretation of Gelzer (1917, 998) and Ehrenwirth (1971, 66). Such a reading of the text runs counter to the hope of the Rhegians that Brutus and Cassius might soon return to Rome, and, as one of the referees for *CP* has pointed out to me, *de suo iure decedere*, which is found elsewhere (e.g., *Rosc. Am.* 73; *Off.* 2.64; Att. 16.2.1; Livy 3.33.10, 3.46.3), seems to mean "to surrender (temporarily) one's prerogatives." The edict attested by Velleius Paterculus 2.62.3, in which Brutus and Cassius did offer to resign their offices and go into voluntary exile *dum rei publicae constaret concordia* (words recalling *concordiae ac libertatis causa* of *Fam.* 11.3.3; see Woodman 1983, 134) was probably issued after the meeting of the Senate on 1 Aug. failed to lead to their recall to Rome.

25. C. 7 June, at a family council held in Antium, at which Cicero was present, Servilia, Brutus' politically connected mother, promised to get the Senate to rescind the clause imposing the *curatio frumenti* (Att. 15.11.2). On Servilia's considerable power behind the scenes, see Bauman 1992, 7.

26. The date favored by Broughton (1952, 321), Drumann and Groebe (1899, 431), Sternkopf (1912, 384–85), and Holmes (1928, 196–97), because Cicero (*Phil.* 2.31) mentions provinces being assigned immediately after recounting the celebration of Brutus' *Apollinares* (6–13 July). If, on the other hand, Frisch (1946, 104) is correct in concluding that the assignment of Crete and Cyrene was contained in the *senatus consultum* of 5 June establishing the *curatio frumenti*, then any adjustment of the latter was bound to reopen the question of which provinces Brutus and Cassius were to govern in 43.

27. The meeting on 1 Aug. is the first attested after the passage of the *senatus consultum* on 5 June establishing the *curatio frumenti* (Stein 1930, 77), and according to Cicero (*Phil.* 1.6) the Senate rarely met after 1 June.

28. Bonnefond-Coudry 1989, 358–61.

29. Details of the meeting on 28 Nov. in *Phil.* 3.19–24. On the need for a quorum to pass a *supplicatio*, see Bonnefond-Coudry 1989, 409–11.



sure exempting an individual from a law) or when it assigned consular provinces,<sup>30</sup> we can readily understand how the summoning of a *frequens senatus* for 1 August gave rise to the two predictions made by the Rhegians. On the one hand, they may have anticipated some action to be taken on the *privilegium* that had been voted earlier to exempt Brutus, the *praetor urbanus*, from the requirement that he not be absent from Rome for more than ten days.<sup>31</sup> Any readjustment in the duties assigned to Brutus would necessarily bring up for reconsideration that earlier decree and so call for a quorum. On the other hand, the Rhegians' prediction that Antony would renounce his right to govern the two Gauls (*remissis provinciis Galliis*) suggests that they optimistically anticipated that the Senate would reassert its right to assign the consular provinces.

Antony, naturally, had no desire to see any of this happen. His hostile counter-edict and insulting letter to Brutus and Cassius around 1 or 2 August (attested by *Fam.* 11.3.1) prove as much. Apparently the Liberators and their supporters miscalculated their chances of parlaying the good will of the people won by Brutus' lavish production of the *Ludi Apollinares* into a movement calling for the return of Brutus and Cassius to Rome. The only voice raised against Antony at the meeting on 1 August was that of Caesar's father-in-law, L. Calpurnius Piso (*cos.* 58), who found no supporters among his fellow senators (*Phil.* 1.10, 14–15). In the end, Antony emerged stronger than before, and even his quarrel with Octavian was temporarily patched up when some of Caesar's veterans put pressure on Antony and Octavian to renounce publicly their hostility.<sup>32</sup>

This summary of what most likely transpired in the weeks leading up to the meeting on 1 August accounts for everything that we learn from the two passages in Cicero except for the speech of Antony, which is mentioned only in the *Philippic* and plays such a prominent role in the modern reconstruction of Antony's supposed volte-face. Let us take a closer look at that speech to determine, if we can, when it was delivered and what it may have contained. As we have previously noted, the prevailing view that Antony's speech was delivered in reaction to popular demonstrations at Octavian's games suggests a date of around 25 July, a few days after the games commenced on the 20th and the demonstrations gained momentum. (See the Table of Dates at the end of this article for an overview of the chronology.) Moreover, since the Rhegians brought a transcript of that speech to Cicero on 7 August, they cannot have left Rome before the speech was delivered, and yet sufficient time must be allowed for them to reach home a day or two before they visited Cicero at Leucopetra. The date of their arrival in Rhegium was most likely around 5 or 6 August because (1) Cicero stresses in

30. Bonnefond-Coudry 1989, 401–9.

31. *Phil.* 2.31: *cur M. Brutus referente te legibus est solutus, si ab urbe plus quam decem dies afuisset?* Antony seems to have secured this *privilegium* in early April, to judge from the apparent allusion to his friendly intervention that is found in *Att.* 14.6.1 of 12 April.

32. The reconciliation, which appears to have taken place on the Capitoline in late July, or early August, is reported by Nicolaus Damascenus (*Vita Caes.* 29.15–19), Plutarch (*Ant.* 16.6), Appian (*B Civ.* 3.29–30), and Dio (45.8.2), but is not mentioned by Suetonius.

both passages that his informants had “freshly returned from Rome” (*Roma sane recentes*),<sup>33</sup> and (2) they had not called on Cicero previously, although he had been staying at Leucopetra since around 2 August, when his ship from Syracuse was blown back on the south coast of Italy when trying to sail for Greece (*Phil.* 1.7). Presumably their visit occurred on the 7th, and not earlier in the month, because during the first few days of Cicero’s enforced stay at Leucopetra (c. 2–5 Aug.) the Rhegians had not yet reached home and learned of Cicero’s presence in their neighborhood.

If we work back from the probable date of the Rhegians’ arrival home (c. 5–6 Aug.), it will be seen that there is scarcely enough time for them to travel from Rome to Rhegium with a copy of Antony’s speech in their possession, if that *contio* occurred as late as 25 July.<sup>34</sup> (For distances and place names referred to in this section of the paper, please consult the map below.) By sea, it is true, a freighter could sail from Ostia to Rhegium (c. 320 mi. across the open sea) under favorable conditions in a matter of three or four days,<sup>35</sup> but we know that in the last week of July and first week of August 44, the weather was quite unfavorable. Not only did the seasonal northerly winds fail to spring up at the usual time, in the latter part of July, but during the first week in August, a prevailing wind from the south (the *Auster*) prevented Cicero from crossing from southern Italy to Greece.<sup>36</sup> That same wind from the south would have been a hindrance to the Rhegians traveling from north to south.

On top of this, a resurgence of piracy along the Italian coast made travel by sea risky.<sup>37</sup> It was only after much hesitation that Cicero finally embarked from his villa near Pompeii on 17 July, choosing the sea over the more secure route overland to Brundisium because he wished to avoid the risk of meeting up with Antony’s legions that were expected to arrive in Brundisium from Macedonia.<sup>38</sup> When Cicero’s hope of sailing under the protection of Brutus’ fleet (*Att.* 16.1.3) could not be realized because Brutus kept delaying his departure (*Att.* 16.5.3), Cicero finally set out on three

33. Lewis and Short (s.v. *recens*) cite *Att.* 16.7.1, translating “directly from Rome.” I thank my colleague Allan Kershaw for discussing with me the precise sense of *recentes* in the two Ciceronian passages.

34. Ehrenwirth (1971, 65), who assigns Antony’s *contio* to around 29 July, allows even less time for their journey.

35. Apparently the journey of P. Clodius from the Straits of Messina to Rome in seven days in 60 B.C.E. was considered something to boast of (*Att.* 2.1.5), but as we can tell from the two days it took St. Paul to sail from Rhegium to Puteoli (Acts of the Apostles 28:13), it was possible to cover the distance from Rome to Rhegium in a matter of three or four days, if the weather cooperated. I thank my colleague Michael Alexander for calling my attention to the passage in Acts.

36. *Phil.* 1.7; *Att.* 16.7.5. Writing on 25 July (*Att.* 16.6.1), Cicero states that he was forced to travel chiefly by oar, instead of by sail, because of the absence of the *prodromi*. These winds ordinarily blew from the north for some eight days preceding the rising of the Dog Star on 18 July (Plin. *HN* 2.123; cf. Columella *Rust.* 11.2.51: *vi Id. Iul. prodromi flare incipiunt*) and were followed a day or two later by the Etesian winds, which blew from the north for 30 days (Plin. *HN* 2.124). However, the failure of the Etesians to appear throughout the course of Cicero’s outward voyage in 44 (17 July–6 Aug.) is attested by *Fam.* 12.25.3 (*me Etesiae, quasi boni cives, relinquentem rem publicam prosequi noluerunt Austerque adversus maximo flatu ad tribulis tuos Regium rettulit*; cf. *Ad Brut.* 1.15.5).

37. The presence of pirates in the Lower Sea is attested in letters written on 8 and 11 July (*Att.* 16.1.3 and 2.4). The effect this piracy had on the disruption of shipments of grain to Rome may have provided the justification for the *senatus consultum* assigning the *curatio frumenti* to Brutus and Cassius.

38. *Att.* 16.5.3, 16.4.4, and 16.2.4 of 9, 10, and 11 July respectively.



Map of Italy. After a map on the Interactive Ancient Mediterranean Web Site.

ten-oared *actuariolae* (Att. 16.3.6). These small, swift passenger ships, which employed both oars and sails (Isid. *Etym.* 19.1.24), allowed Cicero to hug the coast and avoid falling in with pirates in the shipping lanes on the high seas. It took Cicero, however, seven days to travel by sea from near Pompeii to Vibo (c. 190 mi.) because of the unfavorable weather conditions noted above.<sup>39</sup> Consequently, if the Rhegians traveled in a similar fashion from Rome, starting about 150 miles farther up the coast from Pompeii, we must allow approximately 15 days for their journey, placing their departure from Rome around 22 July at the latest.<sup>40</sup>

39. Cicero reached Vibo on 24 July, the eighth day after he set out, having stayed one day at Velia (Att. 16.6.1). He traveled, therefore, at the rate of c. 27 mi. per day (c. 190 mi. ÷ 7).

40. Presumably they hugged the coast (a route of c. 400 mi.) and put in to shore each night, as small ships customarily did: see Casson 1974, 151–54. Therefore, c. 400 mi. ÷ 27 (Cicero's daily average) = 14.8 days (c. 22 July–c. 5 Aug.). The difficulty in estimating the length of time needed for a journey by sea (influenced as it was by weather conditions and the availability of transport) is illustrated (1) by the fact that

If, on the other hand, the Rhegians traveled by land—as seems more likely, owing to the unfavorable weather conditions and the risk of being captured by pirates—we must place their departure from Rome no later than 22 July, and possibly a bit earlier. Strabo (6.3.7 [283]) informs us that the journey by road from Rome to Rhegium required three or four days more than the journey from Rome to Brundisium,<sup>41</sup> a distance that could be covered in as few as nine days (Ov. *Pont.* 4.5.7–8), but could take as many as fifteen days at the leisurely pace adopted by Horace and his companions.<sup>42</sup> Presumably the distinguished (*illustres*) citizens of Rhegium traveled in something approximating the style of Horace since they had no particular reason to hurry home and stopped off along the way to visit their friends (as evidenced by the *hospes* of Brutus). We can, therefore, estimate that it took them more than 15 days to reach their hometown, and they must have left Rome on, or about, 20 July, if they arrived around 5 August.<sup>43</sup>

An estimated date of departure around 20 July is supported by the fact that the Rhegians who came directly from Rome (and had a copy of Antony's *contio*) did not have in their possession a copy of the edict issued by Brutus and Cassius. That edict must have been issued a week to ten days before 1 August (c. 22–25 July), if it was intended to influence the meeting of the Senate called for the first, since the authors needed to allow sufficient time for their edict (and letters) to circulate and influence public opinion. Therefore, if the Rhegians who came directly from Rome departed before this edict became known, that lack of knowledge on their part furnishes one more indication that they set out well before any demonstrations at Octavian's games could have influenced Antony to think of changing political course (as scholars suppose was indicated in his *contio*).

A date of departure around 20 July is entirely plausible if we bear in mind that the Rhegians who met with Cicero on 7 August were obviously supporters of Brutus and Cassius, and so their chief reason for traveling to Rome in the first place may have been to show their support for Brutus by attending his production of the *Apollinares* (6–13 July).<sup>44</sup> Possibly they lingered in Rome a little longer in order to vote in the election that seems to have been called during the week after those games to fill a vacancy in the tribunate.<sup>45</sup> However, once those two reasons for their visit had been

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Cicero sailed from Syracuse, Sicily, on 2 August and yet five days later (7 Aug.) was still storm bound at Leucopetra (c. 60 mi. from Syracuse), and (2) by the fact that despite Cicero's profession of eagerness to return to Rome as soon as possible after receiving the news from the Rhegians on 7 August (*Phil.* 1.9), ten days later (17 Aug.) he had progressed no farther than Velia (*Att.* 16.7.5), c. 175 mi. from Leucopetra.

41. The road from Rhegium to Rome was some 88 *milia passuum* (*mp*) longer than the road from Brundisium (453 *mp* as compared with 365 *mp*: Miller 1916, 333, 366), and the road that branched off the Via Appia at Capua to take a traveler to Rhegium passed through rugged territory. For a map, see Radke 1973, 1512.

42. *Sat.* 1.5; see Kiessling and Heinze 1961, 90.

43. If they departed c. 20 July and arrived c. 5 August, this works out to an average of 24.7 mi. per day (c. 420 mi. ÷ 17 days), which is well within the range of speed estimated by Riepl (1913, 145–46) for travel by road (19–30 mi. per day), a bit faster than the pace maintained by Horace and his friends (c. 22.4 mi. per day), and a reasonable reduction of the 35–40 mi. per day that Laurence (1999, 82) estimates for the Via Appia, which is easier going than the road from Capua to Rhegium.

44. Brutus' request to Cicero in late June shows how supporters were being urged to be present in Rome at the time of the *Apollinares* (*Att.* 15.26.1).

45. See below, n. 49.

satisfied, there was nothing to detain them further, least of all Octavian's games celebrating the late dictator Caesar, who must have been abhorrent to them. A revised date for their departure around 20 July goes a long way toward explaining the resounding silence in Cicero's letter of 19 August on the subjects of both Octavian's games and Caesar's comet. We would expect both items to be incredibly newsworthy if they were even half as relevant as scholars assume they were in causing Antony to contemplate a rapprochement with his political opponents in the Senate.<sup>46</sup>

It follows, then, that Antony's *contio* must have preceded Octavian's games and so cannot be interpreted as a reaction to them. If we look to the middle of July, where the speech seems to belong, we find several important issues on which Antony took action that must have been pleasing to Cicero (thereby explaining *placuit* in the description of his reaction to reading a transcript of Antony's speech). Both issues involved major clashes between Antony and Octavian, and the fear that those clashes might lead to armed violence can explain the tightening of financial credit in Rome soon after Cicero set out on his journey.<sup>47</sup> One of the conflicts arose when Octavian announced his intention to display Caesar's crown and gilded chair at his games in honor of Caesar and Venus. Antony adamantly opposed Octavian and prevented the emblems from being displayed.<sup>48</sup> The other major clash at about the same time as Antony's *contio* involved Octavian's support for one of the candidates (or perhaps an attempt on his part to stand himself?) at an election.<sup>49</sup> This election was being held to replace the tribune C. Helvius Cinna, who had been killed by a mob in March, and thanks to Antony's forceful opposition, Octavian's ambitions (whatever they were) were thwarted. A firm stand expressed by Antony in his *contio* against either, or both, of these maneuvers by Octavian could readily account for the way Cicero characterizes his positive reaction to Antony's speech, even going so far as to claim that the speech caused him to begin thinking of a return to Rome. This assertion is an exaggeration, to be sure, as we can tell from the

46. If *omnia reliquorum ludorum* in *Att.* 15.26.1 (of 2 July) is to be interpreted as a request for news of Octavian's games (so Shackleton Bailey ad loc.), it is all the more surprising that there was apparently no reference to those games in the two letters that Cicero received from Atticus at Leucopetra (*Att.* 16.7.2, 16.7.6).

47. The unexpected tightening of credit must have occurred sometime after 10 July (the date of the latest news from Rome received by Cicero before sailing; see. n 5) because when Cicero wrote to Atticus on 25 July, he was confident that Atticus would have sufficient funds at his disposal to settle the debts that Cicero had left in his care (*Att.* 16.6.3). Furthermore, Atticus' letter informing Cicero of the sudden crisis in the financial market (*Att.* 16.7.6) must have been written before 1 August because it contained no news of the important meeting of the Senate on that date, about which Cicero knew nothing until he met with Brutus on 17 August (*Att.* 16.7.5).

48. Nic. Dam. *Vita Caes.* 28.108; Plut. *Ant.* 16.5; Dio 45.6.5; App. *B Civ.* 3.28. Earlier in the year (some time between 26 Jan. and 9 Feb. 44), the Senate had voted to Caesar the honor of having a gilded chair and crown displayed in the theater; Weinstock 1971, 281–83.

49. Octavian's candidacy is reported by Plutarch (*Ant.* 16.5), Suetonius (*Aug.* 10.2), and Dio (45.6.2). Appian (*B Civ.* 3.31) more plausibly states that Octavian supported one Flaminius (Chilo?), a candidate. The incident probably occurred in July (Syme 1939, 120), but the evidence of the sources is conflicting. Dio puts it before Octavian's games, while Appian puts the contested election in early August, the dating adopted by Yavetz (1969, 74). In Plutarch, Suetonius, and Dio, Antony's clash with Octavian over the supplementary tribunician election is closely linked with their clash over Octavian's intention to display Caesar's gilded chair and crown at his games—precisely the two themes that we conjecture were treated in Antony's *contio* read by Cicero, in transcript, on 7 August.

more candid statement of his motives in the letter. In writing to Atticus, Cicero makes it plain that he was influenced to turn back chiefly by the criticism of his journey, including a change of heart on the part of Atticus, who no longer supported Cicero's intention to go abroad. The reason given for his return in the *Philippic* puts Cicero in a much better light and avoids the embarrassing mention of the pressure exerted on Cicero by public opinion.

This reading of the passage in the first *Philippic* is entirely consistent with the way in which Cicero tends to present Antony and his policies in the first, as opposed to the second, *Philippic*. In the first speech, Cicero strives to portray Antony as a leader who has strayed from the laudable policies of reconciliation that he pursued during the first few days after Caesar's murder.<sup>50</sup> This theme is found both at the beginning (§§2–5) and towards the end of the speech (§§31–32), where the suggestion is made that Antony has fallen under the influence of bad advisors.<sup>51</sup> It is quite conceivable, therefore, that Cicero cast in a favorable light a speech in which Antony opposed the more radical Caesarian stance of Octavian. Cicero is even willing to claim in the published speech (but *not* in the more candid, private letter to his friend Atticus) that he was inspired by Antony's *contio* to begin thinking of turning back to Rome and re-entering the political arena. This assertion in the *Philippic* suggests (as Cicero clearly intended it to) that he and Antony could find common ground. This common ground, however, need not have been as broad and extensive as scholars have imagined it to be under the influence of Cicero's misdirection. The assumption that Antony extended an olive branch to the Liberators goes too far. To put it another way, what Cicero read in Antony's speech may well have fulfilled merely the second half of the definition of friendship that Sallust (*Cat.* 20.4) has Catiline offer his supporters: *nam idem velle atque idem nolle, ea demum firma amicitia est*.<sup>52</sup> Cicero and Antony might never achieve the *consensio omnium divinarum humanarumque rerum*, that Cicero (*Amic.* 20) gives as his definition of friendship in the fullest sense, but half a loaf (i.e., the sharing of the same aversions, viz., to the demagoguery of Octavian) is better than none.

Given the revised date of Antony's *contio*, which appears to have been delivered shortly before the commencement of Octavian's games on 20 July, we no longer have any reason to credit Antony with saying or doing anything beyond the limited act of blocking the political ambitions of Caesar's chief heir, Octavian. This reconstruction of the contents of Antony's speech provides, according to the principle of Occam's razor, quite a satisfactory explanation of the way in which Cicero characterizes his reaction to reading a transcript of that speech. In my view, Antony never turned back from his policy of distancing himself from the Liberators and their supporters in the Senate soon after the reconciliation reached at the meeting of the Senate on 17 March began to disintegrate. In short, there is not one shred of evidence

50. Throughout the speech, Cicero characterizes himself as a "friend" who is remonstrating with a friend (e.g., §11 *amicus*, §12 *pro amicitia*); it is the act of a friend (*est amicorum*), he asserts, to advise Antony against his ill-conceived legislative proposals (§26).

51. *Solent domestici depravare non numquam* (§33); cf. §8 *repudiatis malis suasoribus*. The notion that Antony was duped by a succession of close associates (first Curio, then his wife Fulvia, and later Cleopatra) finds a prominent place in Plutarch's *Antony* (see Pelling 1988, 118).

52. "For to have the same aims and the same aversions, that indeed is firm friendship."

to prop up the widely accepted modern tradition that Antony contemplated forming a political alliance with the murderers of Caesar.

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#### TABLE OF DATES

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5 June	<i>Senatus consultum</i> assigning <i>curatio frumenti</i> to Brutus and Cassius ( <i>Att.</i> 15.9.1)
c. 7	Conference of Brutus, Cassius, Cicero, and Servilia at Antium ( <i>Att.</i> 15.11)
6–13 July	<i>Ludi Apollinares</i> of M. Brutus ( <i>CIL</i> 1 <sup>2</sup> 321)
10	Latest news from Rome received by Cicero before sailing (n. 5)
17	Cicero sails from his villa near Pompeii ( <i>Att.</i> 16.6.1)
?17–18	Supplementary election for tribunate; <i>dies comitiales</i> (p. 265)
?18	<i>Contio</i> of Antony (pp. 261–65)
20–c. 28	<i>Ludi Veneris Genetricis</i> of Octavian <sup>a</sup>
?20–22	Rhégians leave Rome (pp. 262–65)
?22–25	Edict and letters of Brutus and Cassius ( <i>Att.</i> 16.7.1; cf. <i>Phil.</i> 1.8)
1 August	<i>Frequens senatus</i> : speech of L. Piso ( <i>Phil.</i> 1.10, 14–15) ?propraetorian provinces assigned to Brutus and Cassius (p. 260)
c. 1–2	Hostile edict and letter of Antony to Brutus and Cassius ( <i>Fam.</i> 11.3.1)
2	Cicero sails from Syracuse and is blown off course to Leucopetra ( <i>Phil.</i> 1.7)
4	Edict and letter of Brutus and Cassius replying to Antony ( <i>Att.</i> 16.7.7; <i>Fam.</i> 11.3)
c. 5–6	Rhégians arrive home from Rome (p. 261–62)
6	Cicero sails from Leucopetra and is blown back ( <i>Att.</i> 16.7.1; cf. <i>Phil.</i> 1.7)
7	Rhégians bring news from capital to Cicero ( <i>Phil.</i> 1.8; cf. <i>Att.</i> 16.7.1)
?12–14	Cicero sets out from Rhégium (allowing 4–6 days to reach Velia on 17th)
17	Cicero learns at Velia the outcome of <i>frequens senatus</i> on 1 Aug. ( <i>Att.</i> 16.7.5)
19	Cicero lands at Pompeii ( <i>Att.</i> 16.7.8)
31	Cicero returns to Rome (Plut. <i>Cic.</i> 43.6 with <i>Phil.</i> 5.19)
2 September	Cicero delivers first <i>Philippic</i> ( <i>Phil.</i> 1.11 with <i>Phil.</i> 5.19)

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*Note:* Dates given without any additional notation are firmly established. Those marked “c.” may be fixed with reasonable certainty; a “?” preceding a date indicates that certainty is impossible.

<sup>a</sup>See n. 3 in the text above.

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